This book brings together several directions of work in model theory between the late 1950s and early 1980s.

RésuméCet article discute diverses confusions, actueles ou potentielles, liées á la bivalence et au tiers exclu. Il s'agit, en particulier, 1) d'examiner divers cas illustrant les rapports entre la bivalence et le tiers exclu ; 2) de discuter la thése selon laquelle le tiers exclu et le schéma-T de Tarskipour la vérité entraînent la bivalence; 3) de proposer quelques remarques sur les rapports entre la bivalence, le tiers exclu et la preuve par l'absurde; 4) de scruter un argument répandu selon (...) lequel le tiers exclu vaut pour les termes «précis» et 5) de commenter l'histoire de la terminologie. L'objectif ici est d'attirer l'attention des philosophes sur une distinction importante qui ne reçoit pas souvent le traitement minutieux qu'elle mérite. (shrink)

Zygon®, Volume 57, Issue 2, Page 467-489, June 2022.

It is well known that Tarski proved a result which can be stated roughly as: no sufficiently rich, consistent, classical language can contain its own truth definition. Tarski's way around this problem is to deal with two languages at a time, an object language for which we are defining truth and a metalanguage in which the definition occurs. An obvious question then is: under what conditions can we construct a definition of truth for a given object language. Tarski claims that (...) it is necessary and sufficient that the metalanguage be "essentially richer". Our contention, put bluntly, is that this claim deserves more scrutiny from philosophers than it usually gets and in fact is false unless "essentially richer" means nothing else than "sufficient to contain a truth definition for the object language.". (shrink)

Michael Friedman has recently argued that Carnap'sLogical Syntax of Language is fundamentally flawed in a way that reveals the ultimate failure of logical positivism. Friedman's argument depends crucially on two claims: (1) that Carnap was committed to the view that there is a universal metalanguage and (2) that given what Carnap wanted from a metalanguage, in particular given that he wanted a definition of analytic for an object language, he was in fact committed to a hierarchy of stronger and stronger (...) metalanguages. We argue that neither of these claims need be accepted. We show that there is no textual evidence for (1) and that if metalanguages are to be used for merely descriptive and not also justificatory purposes, Carnap does not need to define analyticity sufficiently for proving consistency, and so could have given a definition that does not entail a hierarchy of metalanguages. (shrink)

Logical Options introduces the extensions and alternatives to classical logic which are most discussed in the philosophical literature: many-sorted logic, second-order logic, modal logics, intuitionistic logic, three-valued logic, fuzzy logic, and free logic. Each logic is introduced with a brief description of some aspect of its philosophical significance, and wherever possible semantic and proof methods are employed to facilitate comparison of the various systems. The book is designed to be useful for philosophy students and professional philosophers who have learned some (...) classical first-order logic and would like to learn about other logics important to their philosophical work. (shrink)

We analyze three applications of Ramsey’s Theorem for 4-tuples to infinite traceable graphs and finitely generated infinite lattices using the tools of reverse mathematics. The applications in graph theory are shown to be equivalent to Ramsey’s Theorem while the application in lattice theory is shown to be provable in the weaker system RCA0.

We discuss in this paper the question of the scope of the principle of tolerance about languages promoted in Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language and the nature of the analogy between it and the rudimentary conventionalism purportedly exhibited in the work of Poincaré and Hilbert. We take it more or less for granted that Poincaré and Hilbert do argue for conventionalism. We begin by sketching Coffa's historical account, which suggests that tolerance be interpreted as a conventionalism that allows us (...) complete freedom to select whatever language we wish—an interpretation that generalizes the conventionalism promoted by Poincaré and Hilbert which allows us complete freedom to select whatever axiom system we wish for geometry. We argue that such an interpretation saddles Carnap with a theory of meaning that has unhappy consequences, a theory we believe he did not hold. We suggest that the principle of linguistic tolerance in fact has a more limited scope; but within that scope the analogy between tolerance and geometric conventionalism is quite tight. (shrink)

This is perhaps the richest book on emotions I have read. It is also a very frustrating book. It appears to be—and Elster more or less suggests this—a series of quite different kinds of essays, connected by somewhat confusing cross references and a general concern for the nature of emotions and their transformations. The first chapter is a position paper on explanation in the social sciences, a plea for “mechanisms” as opposed to law-like principles and straightforward causal accounts. The second (...) chapter is an edifying romp through three very different periods and styles of writing about the emotions. Elster begins with Aristotle’s powerful theory of the emotions, in rich detail and with considerable sympathetic insight. The next section fast-forwards two thousand years and provides us with some of the most challenging remarks and aphorisms of the French moralists of the seventeenth century, Montaigne, Pascal, La Rochefoucault, and La Bruyére. Their wit and sometimes cynicism is delightful, particularly on the subject of hidden and hypocritical self-interest. In their often contradictory insights Elster finds apt examples of his emotional “mechanisms.” Finally, the chapter considers several of the great literary masters and their depiction of the emotions in action. Shakespeare, Jane Austen, and Stendhal are obvious choices. The discussions of Racine, De Lafayette, and George Eliot tend to be, like their work, a good bit more prosaic. (shrink)

The increasing application of artificial intelligence (AI) to healthcare raises both hope and ethical concerns. Some advanced machine learning methods provide accurate clinical predictions at the expense of a significant lack of explainability. Alex John London has defended that accuracy is a more important value than explainability in AI medicine. In this article, we locate the trade-off between accurate performance and explainable algorithms in the context of distributive justice. We acknowledge that accuracy is cardinal from outcome-oriented justice because it helps (...) to maximize patients’ benefits and optimizes limited resources. However, we claim that the opaqueness of the algorithmic black box and its absence of explainability threatens core commitments of procedural fairness such as accountability, avoidance of bias, and transparency. To illustrate this, we discuss liver transplantation as a case of critical medical resources in which the lack of explainability in AI-based allocation algorithms is procedurally unfair. Finally, we provide a number of ethical recommendations for when considering the use of unexplainable algorithms in the distribution of health-related resources. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 7, July 2020, Page 106-109.

Resilience is increasingly discussed as a key concept across many fields of international policymaking from sustainable development and climate change, insecurity, conflict and terrorism to urban and rural planning, international aid provision and the prevention of and responses to natural and man-made disasters. Edited by leading academic authorities from a number of disciplines, this is the first handbook to deal with resilience as a new conceptual approach to understanding and addressing a range of interdependent global challenges. The Handbook is divided (...) into nine sections: Introduction: contested paradigms of resilience; the challenges of resilience; governing uncertainty; resilience and neoliberalism; environmental concerns and climate change adaptation; urban planning; disaster risk reduction and response; international security and insecurity; the policy and practices of international development. Highlighting how resilience-thinking is increasingly transforming international policy-making and government and institutional practices, this book will be an indispensable source of information for students, academics and the wider public interested in resilience, international relations and international security. (shrink)

This volume introduces the major classical Arabic philosophers through substantial selections from the key works (many of which appear in translation for the first time here) in each of the fields—including logic, philosophy of science, natural philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and politics—to which they made significant contributions. -/- An extensive Introduction situating the works within their historical, cultural, and philosophical contexts offers support to students approaching the subject for the first time, as well as to instructors with little or no formal (...) training in Arabic thought. A glossary, select bibliography, and index are also included. (shrink)

Accepting the premise advanced by Empire that networks of language constitute a crucial site for the multitudes in the struggle against global Empire, this brief essay explores how the problems of address within the text call forth, or pre figure, a certain mode of address by critical intellectuals from the non-West. In this sense, both Empire and its critics - in this case, the reception of the text by intellectuals in Taiwan -font a fascinating instance of « co-figuration » that (...) demands the attention of those who find in the notion of the multitude a conceptual mobility adequate to the exposure of non-subjective sovereignty and the diagonal lines of flight from capital. (shrink)

BackgroundFor over 35 years, Africa has continued to host HIV vaccine trials geared towards overturning the HIV/aids pandemic in the continent. However, the methods of sharing the vaccines, when available remain less certain. Therefore, the study aims to explore stakeholders’ perspectives in the global South, in this case, Tanzania, on how HIV vaccines ought to be fairly shared.MethodsThe study deployed a qualitative case study design. Data were collected through in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with a total of 37 purposively (...) selected participants. This included researchers, institutional review board members, a policymaker, HIV/aids advocates, and community advisory board members. The data obtained were inductively and deductively analyzed.Results Findings indicate that HIV vaccines can be shared fairly under the principles of distributive justice (contribution, need and equality). Thus, contribution-based sharing ought to be utilized upon the necessity to prioritize vaccine access or subsidized trial benefits to host communities. Need-based sharing ought to be considered for non-host communities that are at an increased risk of HIV infection. Lastly, equal-based sharing would be useful at later stages of vaccine distribution or when the aforementioned principles are deemed morally inappropriate. However, none of the benefit-sharing approaches is free of limitations and a counterbalancing sense of unfairness.ConclusionFair sharing of HIV vaccines, when available, ought to be informed by the contribution, need and equality principles of distributive justice. Countries in the global south including Tanzania are likely to be prioritized during the distribution of the HIV vaccines due to their participation in HIV vaccine trials and due to the disproportionate HIV burden evident in the region. (shrink)

The volume includes important criticisms of Bayesian reasoning and also gives an insight into some of the points of disagreement amongst advocates of the ...

Organisms and other biological entities are mistake-prone: they get things wrong. The entities of pure physics, such as atoms and inorganic molecules, do not make mistakes: they do what they do according to physical law, with no room for error except on the part of the physicist or their theory. We set out a novel framework for understanding biology and its demarcation from physics – that of mistake-making. We distinguish biological mistakes from mere failures. We then propose a rigorous definition (...) of mistakes that, although invoking the concept of function, is compatible with various views about what functions are. The definition of mistake-making is agential, since mistakes do not just happen ¬– at least in the sense analysed here – but are made. This requires, then, a notion of biological agency which we set out as a definition of the Minimal Biological Agent. The paper then considers a series of objections to the theory presented here, along with our replies. Two key features of our theory of mistakes are, first, that it is a supplement to, not a replacement for, existing general frameworks within which biology is understood and practised. Secondly, it is designed to be experimentally productive. Hence we end with a series of case studies where mistake theory can be shown to be useful in the potential generation of research questions and novel hypotheses of interest to the working biologist. (shrink)

John Rawls is widely regarded as one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, and his work has permanently shaped the nature and terms of moral and political philosophy, deploying a robust and specialized vocabulary that reaches beyond philosophy to political science, economics, sociology, and law. This volume is a complete and accessible guide to Rawls' vocabulary, with over 200 alphabetical encyclopaedic entries written by the world's leading Rawls scholars. From 'basic structure' to 'burdened society', from 'Sidgwick' to (...) 'strains of commitment', and from 'Nash point' to 'natural duties', the volume covers the entirety of Rawls' central ideas and terminology, with illuminating detail and careful cross-referencing. It will be an essential resource for students and scholars of Rawls, as well as for other readers in political philosophy, ethics, political science, sociology, international relations and law. (shrink)

This chapter explains why virtue ethics in the latter twentieth century has taken the following two forms: the first form orders evaluative concepts and then argues that the concept of a virtue is more basic than the concepts of a right act and a good state of affairs; the second form focuses on deeper questions about the nature and ambition of modern ethics and its ability to satisfy our need for reflective guidance. The former is a common approach given its (...) focus on arguments for theory construction. The latter is more radical given that its themes are suspicious of rules and principles and, sometimes, moral theory itself. Because so many debates over virtue ethics reduce to debates over the kind of criteria needed to judge ethical theories, they will remain unresolved. Epistemologists must learn from moral philosophers about the myriad usages of virtue in language, as well as the different models each usage is working within. (shrink)

An exploratory model is presented as a heuristic to indicate how individual perceptions of corporate reputation (before joining) and corporate ethical values (after joining) generate specific individual organizational senses of fit. The paper suggests that an ethical dimension of person-organization fit may go some way in explaining superior acquisition and retention of staff by those who are attracted to specific organizations by levels of corporate social performance consonant with their ethical expectations, or who remain with them by virtue of better (...) personal ethical fits with extant organizational ethical values. Specifically, the model suggests that individual misfits that arise from ethical expectations that either exceed or fall short of perceived organizational ethical performances lead to problematic acquisition and retention behavioural outcomes. (shrink)

An exploratory model is presented as a heuristic to indicate how individual perceptions of corporate reputation (before joining) and corporate ethical values (after joining) generate specific individual organizational senses of fit. The paper suggests that an ethical dimension of person-organization fit may go some way in explaining superior acquisition and retention of staff by those who are attracted to specific organizations by levels of corporate social performance consonant with their ethical expectations, or who remain with them by virtue of better (...) personal ethical fits with extant organizational ethical values. Specifically, the model suggests that individual misfits that arise from ethical expectations that either exceed or fall short of perceived organizational ethical performances lead to problematic acquisition and retention behavioural outcomes. (shrink)